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Causation: A Medico-Legal Battlefield
Albert Averbach*
I
Introductory RemarksM OST DOCTORS WILL CONCEDE THAT anything is possible in
medicine, as medicine is not an exact science.
Many laboratories have performed experimental studies on
the traumatizing of animals, and such studies are conceded to be
inconclusive, as to whether or not trauma can "cause" certain of
the medical mystery diseases. As a result, the medical profession
at the present time concedes that the exact cause of multiple
sclerosis, the muscular dystrophies, hepatitis, arthritis, diabetes,
epilepsy, carcinoma, leukemia, tuberculosis and heart disease is
unknown.
Notwithstanding the fact that the medical profession con-
cedes that it does not know the exact cause of many of the ills
of the human body, we frequently find doctors in trauma cases
taking the view that the described accident could not cause, for
example, cancer or multiple sclerosis.
This type of testimony many times leads to bitter cross-
examination and a courtroom medico-legal battle on causation.
An example of such cross-examination is found in the demon-
stration of a trial of a multiple sclerosis case at the NACCA
Convention at Cleveland which began August 15, 1955.1 The
cross-examination of Dr. M. D. Friedman by Emile Zola Berman2
is well worth reading; as well as the cross-examination by Leo
Karlin of Dr. Julius Wolkin;3 and especially recommended read-
ing is the cross-examination of Dr. Harry W. Slade by Melvin M.
* Of the law firm of Gair, Finley, Averbach, Mahley & Hoffman of Syracuse,
New York City, and Seneca Falls, New York; Chairman of the Board of
Directors and Past President of the International Academy of Trial Lawyers;
Former Governor 2d Circuit of NACCA (N. Y., Conn. and Vt.); Chairman
of the Legislative Committee of the New York State Association of Plain-
tiffs' Trial Lawyers and a member of its Board of Directors; Advisory
Editor of Negligence and Compensation Service; Lecturer on medico-legal
subjects at Symposia of the Law-Science Institute (sponsored by the Uni-
versity of Texas, College of Law and College of Medicine), and the Prac-
tising Law Institute. LL.3., Union University-Albany Law School; etc.
'Reported in full in, Trial and Tort Trends 566-721 (1955). Edited by
Melvin Belli.
2 Ibid., pages 640-657.
3 Ibid., pages 664-677.
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Bei.4 Belli shows very graphically the proper approach in
cross-examination where a doctor admits that "anything is pos-
sible in medicine," 5 yet denies that trauma could aggravate mul-
tiple sclerosis. In this cross-examination, Beli dwelt upon the
medical interpretation of the words "possible" and "probable." 6
It will be noted that Belli was able to get the doctor to concede
that no one could positively state that multiple sclerosis could not
be aggravated by trauma.6 The doctor conceded that medical
science is still groping as to whether or not there is a relation of
causation or aggravation by trauma to multiple sclerosis.7
The summations of Emile Zola Berman and Harry A. Gair
touch upon this medical controversy and are well worth ex-
amination.8
During the medico-legal session at the Convention (August
16, 1955), in discussing the possibility of a single trauma causing
or aggravating a cancer, Dr. Simon Koletsky, of Cleveland, Ohio,
conceded, in answer to a question put to him by Leo Karlin: 9
"Dr. Koletsky: I do not think we can disprove the fact that
this trauma may have initiated the carcinoma, and I would
give the patient every benefit of the doubt. The mere fact
that we cannot disprove this fact, or one might put it the
other way, that we cannot prove it at this time, would not
necessarily mean that it can be absolutely eliminated as a
possible etiologic factor."
Mr. Karlin- Is that not based upon the belief among you
men of the medical profession that you look for the absolute
certainty?
Dr. Koletsky: Wherever possible.
Mr. Karlin: I assume that you appreciate from your
experience with lawyers, Doctor, that, in the law, absolute
proof or certainty of proof is not required. Rather, that
what a lawyer must prove in proving such a case is enough
facts from which a reasonable inference can be raised?
Dr. Koletsky: Yes. You have put it much better than
I did. That is the reason that I state that I will accept the
conclusion that the trauma may have been an initiating
factor.
4 Ibid., pages 698-708.
5 Ibid., page 699.
8 Ibid., page 705.
7 Ibid., page 708.
8 Ibid., pages 709-715; Mr. Gair, pages 715-721.
9 Ibid., pages 208 et seq.
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Mr. Karlin: Let me put it this way, Doctor. In this par-
ticular case that we are discussing, as you analyzed the fact,
was there not in your own mind a conscious reaction that
this was the kind of a case where, notwithstanding the
scientific tests, you might be impelled to believe that there
was a causal connection between the trauma and the cancer?
Dr. Koletsky: Yes, and I so stated.
Mr. Karlin: And yet even though there is such con-
scious impelled thinking, the scientific tests sometimes cause
a doctor to take an opposite view, isn't that true?
Dr. Koletsky: Yes. I think where one is not satisfied as
to the scientific evidence, and this is our business, not the
philosophic side, I think our business is in the establishment
of the truth and not in the establishment of a theoretical
possibility.
I can see the theoretical possibility. I am unhappy about
the scientific evidence that would establish this as an item
of truth.
Mr. Karlin: But the lawyers can't furnish that scientific
evidence, can they?
Dr. Koletsky: I don't think so.
Mr. Karlin: Then is it then the problem of the medical
profession?
Dr. Koletsky: Yes.
Mr. Karlin: Doctor, do you know that it is on the basis
of that conflict in thinking that at least two courts in the
United States, Minnesota and Rhode Island, have reached
a conclusion that since in all of these cancer cases doctors
can't agree, they are going to follow the sequence-of-events
theory, and if the lawyer proves the person was healthy be-
fore the trauma, and after the trauma had a cancer, it is a
question of fact for the jury?" 10
Dr. Harry Goldblatt of Cleveland, in discussing the same
cancer case, said:
"Actually, in any group of medical men, when it comes to the
matter of relationship between a single injury and the de-
velopment of any condition or disease in the human body,
there is likely to be a definite division of opinion. Some-
times it's about a fifty-fifty division, for a very good reason.
That is that though there may be evidence for the pro and
the con, the proof is difficult to adduce in such cases. This
particular one is particularly so, for very obvious reasons.
"As a matter of fact, every medical student is taught, and
medical doctors grow up with the view, that it is better to
adopt a sort of an attitude of stringent criticism or stringent
skepticism toward this whole view of injury and the de-
velopment of cancer, and especially, of course, a single
mechanical trauma of which this case is an illustration."
10 75 R. I. App. 191 (1950); 48 N. W. 2nd 735 (Minn., 1951).
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Cancer From Single Trauma
"The textbooks, for example, on the subject start out very
boldly, as a rule, with an unequivocal statement that there
is probably no relationship, or it is difficult to prove in a
given case any direct relationship between the single trauma
and the development of cancer, and yet as you read down in
those paragraphs in the textbooks you find that they begin
to weasel a bit and wind up by saying that there may be
certain special cases in which such a relationship can and
probably does exist, and then they go into the details on the
special conditions that would lead any expert in the field to
admit that there was probably a relationship between the
two." 1
Joseph Schneider of Boston, in interrogating Dr. Harold Feil
of Cleveland, 12 in connection with the heart case, hit at the root
of the medico-legal problem correctly by translating it into per-
centages, by saying:
"Mr. Schneider: We must establish it was a greater prob-
ability that the accident contributed to the infarct than that
it was spontaneous. We are not met with the burden of proof
that you doctors like to have us die and then open us and
then see for yourselves. * * * Isn't that so, all we need is a
51 per cent opinion?
Dr. Feil: Yes. I will agree with that.
Mr. Schneider: Fifty-one per cent?
Dr. Feil: I will agree to that."
In order to adequately develop the premise of the title of
this article-that there is a "battlefield" between the medical and
legal professions in connection with causation-it will be neces-
sary to quote extensively from several articles and court holdings
touching upon the subject. It seems incongruous to the trial
lawyer to have doctors take such a positive view in connection
with causation, and sometimes with aggravation and precipi-
tation, of diseases and ills with obscure, or unknown etiology,
especially in the face of many court decisions supporting the
lawyer's view that such diseases or ills are caused, aggravated
or precipitated by trauma. The lawyers, of course, are armed
with such court decisions, and also with opinions of the medical
profession in authoritative medical books or journals. This in-
variably leads to a battle in the court room and to misunderstand-
ing between the two professions. It must always be borne in
mind that the controversies as to causes of medical conditions
11 Trial and Tort Trends (1955), page 201.
12 Ibid., page 231.
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and diseases primarily are "doctor-made," and not "lawyer-
made." There are different schools of thought among the doctors
as to causation, aggravation and precipitation of many of the
so-called "medical mystery ills."
Dr. Cannon, in The Wisdom of the Body,"3 has compiled an
imposing list of the various disorders which he believes may be
caused, precipitated or aggravated by emotional trauma, with or
without coincidental physical injury. Included in this list are
bronchial asthma and da Costa's syndrome 1 4 affecting the respira-
tory tract, angina pectoris,15 hypertension and neuro-circulatory
asthenia affecting the cardio-vascular system, rheumatoid arth-
ritis affecting the locomotor system, mucous colitis and peptic
ulcer affecting the digestive system; retention of urine, enuresis
and impotence affecting the genitourinary system; thyro-toxicosis
and diabetes mellitus affecting the endocrine system, and neuro-
dermatitis and psoriasis affecting the skin.
It should be emphasized that it is unlikely that any of these
disorders can be properly regarded as an expected consequence
of an emotional trauma in an average person. In most, if not all
of these instances, the part played by emotional disturbance in-
cident or subsequent to trauma is probably no more than a trigger
mechanism by which a pre-existing and latent disorder is brought
to light.'l This last consideration, of course, does not militate
against legal redress.
It has long been recognized that the emotional disturbances
evoked by trauma, or by its complications, may cause or con-
tribute to a wide variety of psychic or psychosomatic disorders.
One of the outstanding authorities on the psychosomatic
effects of psychic trauma is Dr. Hans Selye of the Institute of
Experimental Medicine and Surgery, University of Montreal,
Canada. The research of this pioneer indicates that there may
be a common cause for almost all disease, namely, a chemical
(endocrine) imbalance in the body caused by stress. He also
propounded the concept of the post-traumatic reaction termed
"General Adaptation Syndrome." This syndrome, initiated by
13 Cannon, Walter, The Wisdom of the Body (Norton Co., N. Y., 1932).
14 Neurocirculatory asthenia (weakness).
15 Paroxysmal breast pain.
16 Moritz, Allen R., Pathology of Trauma, 16, 17 (Lea & Febiger, Phila.,
1954).
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injury, is divided into three stages-the alarm reaction, the stage
of resistance and the stage of exhaustion. Dr. Selye believes that
the excessive and continued elaboration of hormones by the
anterior pituitary and adrenal cortex, incident to protracted or
repeated trauma, may predispose to, or cause, various forms of
cardio-vascular, renal or joint disease. These he refers to as the
diseases of adaptation. Among them are nephro-sclerosis, poly-
arthritis, carditis and arthritis. While these findings are based
principally on animal experiments, there is some evidence that
they also obtain with respect to the human physiology.
Cortisone and ACTH have been effective on a wide variety
of maladies which have always been considered unrelated.
Selye's answer as to how this could be so, was that the same types
of diseases had been induced experimentally in animals by ex-
cess, DCA, or STH (adrenal hormones). A disease being caused
by this imbalance was relieved when the chemical balance was
restored by the application of ACTH and cortisone. His theory
was widely publicized in the January, 1955 issue of Reader's
Digest, in an article entitled "Is Stress the Cause of All Dis-
eases?" 17
In the court room, the trial lawyer strives to introduce
medical testimony as to the cause of a condition or disease.
Resort in many instances is made, through a hypothetical ques-
tion to a non-attending physician, as to whether or not the acci-
dent described was a competent cause of a later-described or
assumed condition, or "might," "could, 1 "would," or "was" com-
petent to have caused it. A great conflict exists in the various
states as to the permissible range of inquiry in such cases, de-
pending upon the particular jurisdiction's interpretation of the
requirement that medical opinions must be reasonably certain
or reasonably probable.
Authorities Collated and Discussed.
Reported cases indicate that medical opinion testimony has
been admitted to the effect that practically any disease or bodily
17 Selye, Hans, Stress (1950 Acta Inc., Montreal, Canada). See also, Aver-
bach, Albert, Secondary ffects and Complications of Trauma-Appendix
to Trial and Tort Trends (1955) pages 1-5; Wasmuth, Medical Evaluation
of Mental Pain & Suffering, 6 Clev.-Mar. L. R. 7 (1957); McNeal, 'The
Medical Expert Witness-Positive--Negative-Maybe," J. of For. Sci. (April,
1957).
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injury known to medical science "could," "would," or "might"
have been caused by traumatism.1 8
Some of the states require the phrasing of a question, with
reference to causation, to be within the rule of "reasonable
probability," and some states require an answer to be within
"reasonable certainty."
Others, however, permit a question to be put to an expert,
as to whether or not a stated condition "might" or "might not"
have produced a given result, and whether a given result "might"
or "might not" be attributable to a suggested cause. Some states
take the view that, for a witness to state "I believe the injuries
described were the result of the accident" is objectionable, in
that it elicits from the witness a conclusion upon the precise
matter presented for tue jury to determine, and thus "invades the
province of the jury." 19
Dean Wigmore has suggested that the labored efforts of
courts to differentiate between questions seeking opinions as to
what could, or what might, or what did, produce a given result
are pointless; that the purpose of expert opinion is to aid the
jury, and that its function cannot be usurped, because in all
events it is free to accept or reject the offered opinion.2 0
Some of the states require the doctor to definitely state that
the injury and consequent disability are results of the accident.
Other states, however, have adopted a far more lenient rule,
which permits a doctor to answer a hypothetical question to
the effect that trauma "could" or "might" have had a causal
connection with a described or resulting injury or disease.
18 Williams v. State, 162 Ark. 285, 258 S. W. 386 (1924, Pneumonia); Bickes
v. Travelers Ins. Co., 87 Colo. 297, 287 P. 859 (1930, meningeal hemorrhage);
Boehm v. Detroit, 141 Mich. 277, 104 N. W. 626 (1905, abscess); Whitely v.
Stein, 34 S. W. 2d 998 (Mo. App., 1931, epilepsy); Kreutzwald v. Walters,
242 App. Div. 479, 275 N. Y. S. 878 (1934, tuberculosis); Newton v. Gretter,
60 N. Dak. 635, 236 N. W. 254 (1931, goitre); Kellogg v. Industrial Commis-
sion, 60 Ohio App. 22, 19 N. E. 2d 511 (1938, sarcoma); Kniseley v. Kniseley,
120 Pa. Super. 140, 182 A. 51 (1935, mycarditis and Bright's disease); Paul
v. Atlantic Refining Co., 304 Pa. 360, 156 A. 94 (1931, ulcer); Georgia Cas.
Co. v. Little, 281 S. W. 1092 (Tex. Civ. App., 1926, diabetes); Texas Indemnity
Co. v. Nelson, 281 S. W. 289 (Tex. Civ. App., 1926, varicose veins); LaVine
v. State, 204 Wis. 41, 233 N. W. 549 (1930, rupture of aorta).
19 Broderick v. Brooklyn, etc. R. Co., 186 App. Div. 546, 174 N. Y. S. 571
(1919). See also, Aetna L. Ins. Co. v. Bethel, 140 Ky. 609, 131 S. W. 2d 523
(1954), and 1 Schweitzer, Cyclopedia of Trial Practice, 237 (1954).
20 7 Wigmore on Evidence, Sec. 1976 (3rd ed., 1940); Busch, Francis X., Law
and Tactics in Jury Trials, 622-623 (Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., In-
dianapolis, 1949).
7Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1957
CLEVELAND-MARSHALL LAW REVIEW
It is my firm opinion that lawyers must take the time to
discuss with the medical experts, in person, this vexing problem
of the legal or lawyers' definitions of "causation," "aggravation,"
and "precipitation" as distinguished from the medical definitions.
Too many doctors think in terms of differential diagnosis when
they are asked a hypothetical question to whether or not a given
state of facts was, in the doctor's opinion, within the degree of
reasonable medical certainty, a competent producing cause of
the medical ills found on the examination. When this problem
has been clarified by personal discussions with the doctor, then
the resulting medical testimony is far better received in the
courtroom.
It is distressing to note that a great number of the doctors
testifying in trauma cases are totally unprepared for the thinking
of the legal profession on the subjects of "causation," "aggrava-
tion" and "precipitation." We find that the doctors, because of
their training, are thinking in terms of the exact, precise, and one
and only cause of a particular condition, while the lawyers, be-
cause of their training, are thinking not of an exact knowledge,
but of the reaching of an inference of reasonable medical cer-
tainty from a sequence of facts from which that particular in-
ference can be derived. This is particularly apparent in cases
involving the so-called "medical mysteries," or obscure diseases
such as multiple sclerosis, arthritis, epilepsy, the muscular
dystrophies, diabetes, carcinoma, leukemia, hepatitis, tuberculosis
and heart disease. The doctors seem to feel that until they know
what definitely causes these diseases, they are not prepared to
say that trauma might or could have caused them or aggravated
them.
In those states in which a causal relation must be proved,
between the accident and the disease, by a hypothetical ques-
tion, it is simpler to establish aggravation or precipitation be-
tween the trauma and the disease than to establish causation, if
the state permits an answer by a doctor that such accident could
have a causal connection, in the opinion of the doctor, within
reasonable medical certainty. But in those states that call for a
direct "was" or "is" answer, the plaintiff's attorneys find that it is
much more difficult to establish causation by testimony of the
medical witness.
A very fine discussion of this vexing problem is contained in
a magnificent article by Ben Small, Professor at Indiana Uni-
versity Law School. It is entitled "Gaffing at a Thing Called
8https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol6/iss2/7
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Cause: Medico-Legal Conflicts in the Concept of Causation." 21
Professor Small discusses the meaning of the doctor's phrase
"cause," the lawyer's phrase "cause," and the Workme's corm-
pensation phrase "cause." He says: 
22
"But if the doctor is horrified at the lawyer's cause in those
cases where even he must admit precipitation, what must his
feelings be when the lawyer brashly defines cause in a
medical area where even the medical profession fears to tread
and is in a state of collective disagreement over precipitating
circumstances? Take cancer causation as an example; it is
an especially good one because the lawyers seem to know
so much about it and the doctors so little."
In discussing the lawyer's view, Professor Small says:
"The lawyer simply is not after the same cause as the
doctor, and therefore cannot be expected to reach the same
causal ends." 23
Further, in discussing the reasons for the divergence be-
tween the view of the doctor and that of the lawyer, Professor
Small says: 24
"The differences between doctor and lawyer on cause for
cancer should, by this time, be obvious. The doctor, while he
does not know the one single, certain cause for cancer, does
seem to know what the one single, certain cause for cancer
is not-it is not trauma, as the word is commonly used. In
the face of this more or less chronic assertion, the lawyer has
gone about proclaiming busily that he knows the cause and
it is trauma. He cites judicial decisions in tort and work-
men's compensation cases by the dozen to prove his point-
that trauma has caused all sorts of cancer harms, aggrava-
tions, accelerations, activations, metastases, and yes, even
the formation of brand-new cancer out of previously normal
tissue."
Professor Small concludes with the following observation: 
25
"However, while some lawyer-cause cases may be deserving of
attack, the doctor would do well to look deeper into the
remainder before criticizing. He would find that most of the
cases, both in tort and in workmen's compensation, have been
decided on an entirely honest application of lawyer formulae
which relate to the placing of legal responsibility. To be
sure, the lawyer's formulae contribute little toward finding
21 31 Tex. L. R. 630 (Law-Science Symposium issue) (June, 1953).
22 Ibid., page 632.
23 Ibid., page 639.
24 Ibid., page 647.
25 Ibid., page 658.
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the source or etiology of a disease, but the doctor must
realize that they are not designed for that. The formulae,
both proximate cause in tort and occasionment in- work-
men's compensation, are liability standards-they are used
to allocate legal responsibility equitably on the basis of a
sufficiency, not a totality, of causal risk. The doctor must
realize that a determination of legal responsibility is not
the same as finding a pathological cause or source for dis-
ease. The doctor must make room for both approaches and
credit the same respectability to the standards of the lawyer
in the pursuit of his function as he assigns to the standards
which he uses in his own. Then the doctor will understand
how his secondary causal factors can become lawyer's lia-
bility pegs. When he understands the differences between
pathological sources and cost pegs, he may be more inclined
to drop his post hoc charge, realizing that cause is a word of
many uses, many meanings."
In Pittman v. Pillsbury Flour Mills, Inc.,26 a cancer case,
the court said:
"Although the absence of exact medical knowledge on the
cause of cancer makes it impossible to say with absolute
certainty whether a particular injury caused or aggravated
a particular cancer, we are hardly compelled to say that a
finding of cause and effect in a given case is without support
in the evidence because such tenuous uncertainty exists. A
great many findings made by juries, courts, and other triers
of fact rest upon something less than absolute certainty."
Dr. Theodore J. Curphey, Chief Medical Examiner of Nassau
County, Hempstead, New York, in an excellent article entitled
"Trauma and Tumours," 27 makes many references to Professor
Small's article, and says:
"My remarks are directed more towards the medico-legal
rather than the strictly medical aspects of the problem, and
will be in the nature of an attempt to determine the reasons
for the confusion and conflict that exists between the physi-
cian and the lawyer in the matter of causation, as it concerns
the subject under discussion. It is hoped thereby to provide
a better interpretative background, against which both the
lawyer and the physician can individually project his ideas,
and while not necessarily coming to any common agree-
ment, at this time, can at least understand each other's
thinking on the matter. If this initial step meets with any
success, it might even be possible later to approach a common
26 234 Minn. 517, 48 N. W. 2d 735 (1951). Accord-Weller v. Northwest Air-
lines (multiple sclerosis) 58 N. W. 2d 739 (Minn., 1953); cited, 2 Neg. Cases
2d 334.
27 1 J. Forensic Sci., 27-35 (Jan., 1956).
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ground of agreement on certain, if not all, of the conflicting
viewpoints in this field in which medicine and the law
have common responsibilities to society at large.
"this matter of changing concepts of disease on the basis of
current medical advances is one that bears strongly on the
perennial difficulties encountered between Medicine and
the law. The medical expert is bound to stay within the
limits of knowledge in his field when he appears in court to
testify, and it requires little thought for him to recognize that
there are many gaps in the available current knowledge
about any medical subject. Therein lies his vulnerability,
which the clever lawyer knows only too well, and ac-
cordingly pursues fully for the benefit of his client.
"Assuming the role of the devil's advocate for a moment, I
should like to point out how mistaken the doctor frequently
is in his estimate of the legal process. Unfortunately, we
find at times amongst us in medicine, the type of physician
nurtured in the rarefied atmosphere of the medical school
or hospital or research institution, and conditioned before-
hand in the narrower limits of the academic environment-
who resents what he considers to be a rebuff to his carefully
considered opinions at the hands of the equally carefully
prepared lawyer-and who, as a result, withdraws from one
of his medico-social responsibilities by shunning the law
courts for the rest of his professional days. The basic founda-
tion for this action on the physician's part lies in the funda-
mental differences between the two professions in their
approach to a problem involving both legal and medical
issues. In medicine, the physician thinks of the cause of a
disease in terms of its inciting agent; to him, the tubercle
bacillus is the cause of tuberculosis, while in the instance of
cancer, there is as yet no known cause as he understands
it. Similarly, the physician envisages the course of a certain
disease as following a certain generally accepted clinical
pattern, and finds it hard to admit the existence of any
extraneous factor in the environment as being operative in
affecting such a course, especially when there is no clinical
evidence of change in the predictable pattern attributable to
the action of this extraneous factor. This is all very well as
far as it goes in medicine; the difficulty is that in the case of
the law, it does not go far enough.
"In this connection, one of the bones of contention between
the doctor and the lawyer lies in the field of semantics, and
concerns their respective concepts of certain word images.
For example, the word 'sanity' has different connotations,
depending on whether it is used in the medical or legal sense.
Similarly, the word 'cause' means one thing to the physician
dealing with disease, and another to the lawyer concerned
11Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1957
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with the legal concept of causation in workmen's compensa-
tion and in tort. It is an interesting fact that as time has
progressed, the lawyers and the doctors have more or less
accepted each other's conception of the word 'sanity' and
have agreed to go their separate ways in recognizing the
difference in definition between medical and legal sanity.
Not so, however, in the case of 'cause' where at present
there still exists a wide difference of opinion between 'cause'
in the medical and 'cause' in the legal sense.
"There is no need to elaborate on the medical concept of
'cause' to a group such as this, but it might be well to at-
tempt an understanding of the term when used in a legal
sense, for it is this basic difference that has led in the past
to such confusion and acrimony in court, especially in the
much litigated questions as to whether trauma can 'cause'
a tumour.
"Thus, Webster's Dictionary 8 defines 'cause' as used in law
as 'A suit for action in court; any legal process by which a
party endeavours to obtain his claim, or what he regards as
his right; case; ground of action.' With this definition in
mind, it immediately becomes apparent that the lawyer
places an entirely different connotation on cause than does
the physician.
"From the above, it is evident that the concept of cause in the
legal sense has no common meeting ground with that of
cause in the medical sense and that the sooner this fact is
recognized, the better will be the inter-relationships be-
tween the lawyer and the doctor in court. For one thing,
it should put an end to many of the pontifical and sometimes
not too pertinent remarks of some of our medical brethren,
who, lacking the appreciation of this difference, are wont to
be caustic in their criticism of the intelligence and even
the integrity of those physicians who testify in court, to
say nothing of the low repute in which they hold the lawyer
who would claim that trauma 'caused' a cancer in his client.
"It is true that these existing conditions call for definite im-
provement, but one must be mindful of the fact that in day-
to-day living, these conditions are always with us, and as
medical people, we have a social obligation to lend our skill
and assistance to society in attempting to assist the law in
coming to as just a decision as to causal relationship, as the
admittedly imperfect evidence in a given case permits. No
single case for litigation in which medical facts are involved
can ever assume the nature of a controlled scientific inves-
tigation, any more than a single case of disease treated by the
physician can be assured of an exact diagnosis and specific
28 "Webster's Dictionary" (2d ed., unabridged, 1951).
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therapy. Why then should we demand more rigid criteria
for adjudicating a medico-legal problem than we do in our
routine daily activities in diagnosing and treating disease?
It simply resolves itself then to a situation where the physi-
cian involved in a legal action of causal relationship between
trauma and tumour must do the best with the facts he has
at hand and render an opinion based on the evidence coupled
with his current medical knowledge. It is an inherent error
of reasoning to assume that such an opinion has to be an
absolute one-it would cease being an opinion if it were!
And here again lies the basis for confusion as to what
'opinion' really means. In the medical sense, it is 'a formal
expression by an expert,' a definition to which the physician
naturally cleaves and which to him might seem to be in the
nature of an oracular revelation at times. To the lawyer,
however, the medical expert is nothing more than an opinion
witness, and he chooses the definition of 'opinion' instead
as 'A belief stronger than an impression, less strong than
positive knowledge.' Mindful of this difference then, if the
physician would only learn to regard himself and his opinion
in the same light as the lawyer's estimate of him and his
opinion, his amour propre in court would be seldom violated
and his contribution to the case would be considerably en-
hanced thereby.
"It would seem to me then that once these semantic differences
in the use of the words 'opinion' and 'cause' are recognized
and accepted by the two groups, and after some sort of truce
is declared, leading to a peaceful coexistence in respect to
causal relationship, that the doctor would do well to revise
and re-evaluate his concepts in the matter of causation and
aggravation of malignant tumours by trauma. Admitting that
much of the confusion in the past in the matter of causation
has been due to each profession misinterpreting the intent
and purpose of the other in the usage of the word, would it
not be better for the doctor in testifying on the matter of
causal relationship between trauma and tumour, to stay
within the rigidly defined limits of the experimental and
clinical evidence in his field and to cease from speculating
on the possible and probable relationships involved in a
court case?
"Thus, current experimental evidence relating single trauma
to causation of malignant growth offers no support whatever
for the contention.
"Unfortunately, this is not always possible in every case, so
that at times the physician is forced to admit the possibility
even though he is prepared to deny the probability and that
on the basis of present knowledge only. Medical opinions
reflect current medical knowledge, which is in turn subject
to modification and change in the light of advances in the
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field. Such opinions in a court of law, however, carry no
greater weight from the medical witness than any other
piece of evidence in the case-frequently one is tempted to
think it currently carries less-so that the doctor should
refrain from speculating as to probable and possible rela-
tionships and stay within the confines of his knowledge on
those cases where the evidence of causal relationship in the
medical sense is not clear cut."
"As times goes on, the very exceptional case is seen where
a single injury does cause or aggravate a malignant tumour,
so that at times, the hypothetical possibility does exist in
fact, but when this occurs, the chain of evidence is readily
appreciated and leaves little need for speculation in respect
to cause and effect. Taking this as the basis for positive
testimony, the physician in court should not hesitate to ex-
press the opinion of lack of relationship between trauma
and tumour, if the case does not fulfill the necessary pos-
tulates. His attitude in this regard should be no different to
the scientist who refuses to accept a bacterial agent as the
cause of a disease unless the evidence is such as to fulfill
Koch's postulates. If the doctor sticks to the medical con-
cept of causation when he testifies in court, fully recognizing
that the lawyer's concept is different from his, he might not
be as welcome a witness at times, but he will certainly be a
more factual medical expert in both the medical and the legal
sense."
Corpus Juris Secundum states, in an opinion as to actual
cause:
"On the ground that the testimony would invade the province
of the jury, it has been held in some cases that the witness
may not testify what specific occurrences actually caused
a particular condition; whether a given cause produced a
given bodily result in a given case; or whether detailed
circumstances actually produced the injury or death.
"On the other hand, it has been stated that the distinction
made in cases which permit a doctor to state what might have•
caused plaintiff's injuries but do not permit him to state
that, in his opinion, a particular accident caused his injury
is of doubtful significance and too fine and fanciful as a
practical matter; and in a large number of cases the expert
has been permitted to state his inference as to the cause of
certain injuries, of an observed physical condition, or, ac-
cording to the decisions on the subject, of the death of a
person, particularly where an injury or disease is of such
character as to require a person skilled in the science or
practice of medicine to determine its cause." 29
29 32 C. J. S., Evidence, Sec. 534, and cases there cited.
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American Jurisprudence, takes the view that: so
"Nature and Form of Opinion That May be Expressed. With
regard to the nature of the opinion that may be rendered by
an expert testifying to the causation of injury or death,
there is some diversity of opinion. The general rule is that a
medical expert may express an indirect opinion as to the
cause of injury or death. Such witnesses have been per-
mitted to state what in their opinions was the 'possible,'
'probable' or 'likely,' etc., cause of, or what 'might' or 'could
have' caused, a particular physical condition. An opinion so
expressed is not too uncertain. It seems to be permissible
for an expert witness to express his opinion that the injury
in question was due to, or caused by, 'some such' external
violence as that which the plaintiff suffered. Some courts
have adopted the rule in medical cases that although an ex-
pert may express an opinion as to what 'could' or 'might' have
caused a particular physical condition or sickness, he cannot
be permitted to express an opinion that an alleged cause
'did' cause the particular condition or sickness, where the
actual cause is a disputed issue of fact, the ground being
that in such case that question is the ultimate fact for the
jury, and an expression of opinion thereof by an expert
would be an invasion of the jury's domain. Other courts
hold that the question must be so framed as to make the
answer the opinion of the witness instead of his conclusion."
The criticism of the distinction between "might" and "did"
has been considered in some cases to be of doubtful significance. 31
H. Kornblitt, LL.B., M. D., and Editor of Current Medicine
for Attorneiis,32 in the February 1957 issue, under the heading of
"An Old Misunderstanding Between Doctors and Lawyers"
says: 33
"It is therefore necessary for doctors and lawyers to realize
the partisan nature of each of their professions in determin-
ing causation. Causation can never be impartial when
doctors and lawyers argue."
In an article entitled "A Primer for Medical Evidence,"
written by Theodore I. Koskoff, Esq., in the December, 1955 issue
of Medical Trial Technique Quarterly, it is said:3 4
30 20 Am. Jur., Evidence, Sec. 869, pages 733-734.
31 136 A. L. R., Anno., p. 1002, and cases there cited; see also, Armo., 21
A. L. R. 2d 1263; 136 A. L. R., Anno., Admissibility of opinion evidence as
to cause of death, disease, or injury, pages 965-1007.
52 Current Medicine for Attorneys (Brookline, Mass.).
33 Ibid., Vol. 4, No. 15, page 3.
34 Medical Trial Technique, Dec., 1955, pages 89 et seq.
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"If one searched for a single medico-legal problem that gave
the most difficulty to doctors and lawyers alike, the doctrine
of reasonable probability is that problem. The requirement
of legal proof that a particular injury was caused, aggravated,
precipitated or 'lit up' by a particular trauma is met when
it appears that it is reasonably probable that it is so. It is
not necessary that it positively, scientifically in every case
is so. It is only necessary that it be reasonably probable in
the particular case. One treatment of this extensively de-
bated subject expressed it this way:
"'The methods used in medicine and in law to arrive at the
truth are very different. In law it is only necessary that the
doctor give an opinion on the probability, not the certainty
(of a medical fact). When the subject of reasonable prob-
ability is approached in court, the doctor begins to hedge.
He will not state in the courtroom things about which he
may have little doubt privately. He is too inclined to think
of himself as a pure scientist and to think of legal proof in
the same terms as he does of scientific proof. Unless a state-
ment can be proven conclusively, he rarely admits in court
that in his opinion it is so." 35
"Whereas all of these factors are medical in nature doctors
frequently confuse their importance, insofar as reasonable
probability of causation is concerned. For example, as bad
as the physical or psychic condition of a person is before
sustaining an injury, the fact that the trauma superimposed
on this condition causes an injury or disease which in an
otherwise normal person would not be caused, doesn't make
the trauma any less a causative factor of the injury or dis-
ease. For the oft-repeated statement that a person is not
entitled to a perfect specimen upon which to inflict injury is
legally true." 36
Leo Karlin of Chicago eloquently discussed this subject of
causation at the Boston Convention of NACCA, after Dr. Grant-
ley W. Taylor of Boston, had said: 3 7
"It is very hard to say whether an injury has or hasn't any-
thing to do with cancer until we can tell you what causes
cancer, and we are very far from that happy state."
Dr. Lester Adelson, in an article entitled "Injury and Can-
cer," in Physician in the Courtroom, said: 3 8
35 Cohen, Louis H., Doctors and Lawyers in Court, Conn. State Med. J.
(Oct., 1952).
36 See Brahdy & Kahn, Trauma and Disease, 18 (Lea & Febiger, Phila.,
1941). See also, Reed & Emerson, Relationship Between Injury and Disease
(Bobbs-Merrill, 1938).
37 Trial and Tort Trends (1954), pages 440 et seq.
38 Pages 13 et seq. (Press of West. Res. Univ., 1954).
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"The concensus of opinion of modern investigators is that a
single trauma has never been known to cause or produce a
malignant tumor in either human beings or in animals. * * *
A single trauma has never been known to produce a cancer
in an experimental animal. The consistently negative results
indicate that simple trauma, in and of itself, does not possess
the essential elements of a cancerigenic agent. Study and
analysis have widened the breach between real causation of
malignant tumors and the theory that they may be caused
by a single trauma. The new facts do not warrant exclusion
of trauma as a possible factor in many tumors. * * * There
is no organ in the human body in which the development of
a cancer has not at some time or another been ascribed to
injury. * * * Law reports enumerate many cases where the
sequence of trauma-cancer is considered a consequence with
the trauma causing the cancer. Every variety of trauma has
been incriminated in this confusion of sequence and con-
sequence.
"From this brief survey it is evident that an overwhelming
mass of documented scientific evidence opposes the theory
of a traumatic origin of malignant tumors. Practically all
leading modern medical authors and students of the problem
have discarded any theory which postulates the traumatic
origin of a malignant tumor. The etiologic importance of a
single trauma in the genesis of a malignant neoplasm is no
longer a matter of interest to the scientist. The question is
not revived by academic or scientific curiosity, but rather by
commercial interest because of the increasing accessibility
of compensation for injuries.
"A major reason for the continuing controversy is the phrase
'in my opinion.' Most physicians avoid using the word 'im-
possible' in discussing a disease whose etiology is not com-
pletely known. Many authors who in general absolutely deny
the role of trauma in the genesis of tumors do not take as
rigid a stand in an individual case. (Italics ours.)
"The dispute at this time is more philosophic than scientific.
The statement, 'A single trauma has never been proved to be
the cause of animal tumor,' can certainly not be contradicted.
Such a statement cannot be made flatly in human beings
since the possibility of a pre-existing tumor can never be
safely excluded. On the other hand, 'has never been proved'
should not be interpreted as 'can never be the cause.' The
philosophic solution from this line of reasoning is that al-
though the traumatic genesis of tumors has never been
scientifically proved, equally unproved is the assertion that
trauma cannot be an etiologic factor in the origin of malig-
nant growths. However, the weight of direct and indirect
evidence is highly in favor of the former concept. (Italics
ours.)
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"Despite insufficient knowledge, the law requires testimony
as to a causal relationship between a tumor and a preceding
trauma. In rendering such an opinion one cannot in many
instances give cold, scientific fact, only probabilities. The
probability of casualty should be embraced or rejected on
the basis of the weight of all the scientific facts that can be
accumulated and studied. One cannot argue without facts.
"Every question of trauma and tumor is complicated by the
following factors:
1. The ready suggestibility of most human beings.
2. The difficulties of life from which trauma frequently
offers an escape.
3. Poor management of traumatic cases on the part of doctors
and lawyers.
4. The practically universal encouragement of litigation.
5. Modern industrial organization and compensation pro-
visions.
"The legal difficulties are increased by the general insistence
on a positive opinion which a doctor cannot always give and
by the conflicting testimony of experts who take sides in
doubtful cases."
The "reasonable medical certainty" rule has been the subject
of a great deal of legal writing, both in court opinions and in
law journals.39
The genesis of the so-called "reasonable certainty rule" in
New York State seems to flow from Strohm v. New York, Lake
Erie & Western R. Co.4 However, in Cross v. City of Syracuse,41
the Court of Appeals explained its prior decision by the following
comment: 
42
"In the Turner case (Turner v. City of Newburgh, 109 N. Y.
301, 309, 16 N. E. 344, 4 Am. St. Rep. 453) Judge Gray said
that the rule established in the case of Strohm v. N. Y., L. E.
& W. R. R. Co., supra, 'simply precludes the giving of evi-
dence of future consequences which are contingent, specula-
tive, and merely possible, as the basis of ascertaining dam-
ages,' and that it in no wise, conflicted with the rule allowing
evidence of physicians as to a plaintiff's present condition
of bodily suffering or injuries of their permanence and as
to their cause." (Italics ours.)
39 See Charles T. Hvass, Esq. (Minnesota cases), Appendix to Trial and
Tort Trends (1955), pages 36 et seq. See also, Ibid., text, pages 729, 730.
40 96 N. Y. 305 (1884).
41 200 N. Y. 393 (1911).
42 See also Belli's "Modern Trials" Sec. 60 (1), pages 382-389; Secs. 84, 85,
page 375 (1954).
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The holding of the New York Court of Appeals in the
Strohm case, supra, has frequently been misunderstood.
One New York writer s states:
"The Court of Appeals has said that the reasonable certainty
rule laid down in that case (Strohm, supra) applies only to
the development of diseased conditions apprehended in the
future but not present at the time of the inquiry. There is
no intimation in the Strohm case that opinion evidence is
not properly receivable as to the probable effects or the
duration of an existing condition."
The New York Court of Appeals in Griswold v. New York
Central and Hudson River Railroad Co.,4 4 said:
"The appellant relies upon Strohm v. New York, Lake Erie
& Western R. Co., 96 N. Y. 305, and Tozer v. New York
Central & H. R. R. Co., 105 N. Y. 617. We said of these cases
in Turner v. City of Newburgh, 109 N. Y. 309, that they9simply preclude the giving of evidence of future conse-
quences which are contingent, speculative and merely pos-
sible as the basis of ascertaining damages,' and we added
. . . 'that they in nowise conflict with the rule allowing evi-
dence of physicians as to a plaintiff's present condition of
bodily suffering or injuries, of their permanence and as to
their cause.' The questions objected to in this case related
to the permanence of the injuries, and sought a medical
opinion as to their continuance in the future or a recovery
from their effects. The inquiry was proper and competent.
There is an obvious difference between an opinion as to the
permanence of a disease or injury already existing, capable
of being examined and studied, and one as to the merely
possible outbreak of new diseases or sufferings having their
cause in the original injury. In the former case that disease
or injury and its symptoms are present and existing, their
indications are more or less plain and obvious, and from
their severity or slightness a recovery may reasonably be
expected or the contrary; while an opinion that some new
and different complication will arise is merely a double
speculation---one that it may possibly occur, and the other
that if it does, it will be a product of the original injury
instead of some other new and, perhaps, unknown cause.
"The questions objected to were not inadmissible because
they sought the probabilities of a recovery. Certainty was
impossible. Medicine is very far from being an exact science.
At the best, its diagnosis is little more than a guess en-
lightened by experience. The chances of recovery in a given
case are more or less affected by unknown causes and un-
43 7 Warren, Negligence (in New York), 6 (curr. supp. ed.).
4 115 N. Y. 61 (1889).
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expected contingencies; and the wisest physician can do no
more than form an opinion based upon a reasonable prob-
ability. It is argued that the witness must have an opinion
as to the permanence of the injury, and then may express
that; but necessarily the opinion must rest upon a balance of
probabilities, including the medical judgment one way or
the other, and the opinion given is none the worse because
it expresses, and does not conceal, that it rests upon a
reasonable probability strong enough to justify the forma-
tion of an opinion."
Dr. Irving J. Sands of Brooklyn, New York, in an article
appearing in the New York State Journal of Medicine entitled
"Doctors, Lawyers and Injured Brains" said: 45
"There should be mutual respect of physicians and lawyers
for the responsibilities and attitudes of each other. This
would prove a positive contributing factor to judicial ver-
dicts.
Appreciation and respect of each others' attitudes and re-
sponsibilities would contribute to a better relationship be-
tween doctors and lawyers."
III
Conclusion and Suggestions
We have pointed out herein, by reference to some of the
reported literature, that there is a serious misunderstanding
between the medical and the legal professions, with reference
to the terminology used in accident cases in connection with
the subject of "causation," "aggravation" and "precipitation."
Experience indicates that this barrier between the two profes-
sions is surmountable; that this controversy and misunderstand-
ing is curable; that actually the "battlefield" is one of semantics.
It requires some work, however, on the part of both the lawyers
and the doctors.
It is my considered opinion that the pathway for solution
lies in more frequent reference to this subject at Medico-Legal
Symposia, in articles appearing in the medical and legal journals,
and in more frequent joint medicolegal meetings, where this
subject can be thoroughly explained and discussed. For more
detailed discussion of such suggested methods, see the author's
article "Aids for the Improvement of the Doctor-Lawyer Re-
45 Vol. 39, No. 23, Dec., 1939.
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lationship" appearing in the April, 1956 issue of the Insurance
Law Journal and in condensed form in Case and Comment, No-
vember, 1956 issue.
I am in complete accord with the views expressed by Dr.
Samuel R. Gerber, Coroner of Cuyahoga County (Cleveland),
Ohio, in an excellent article entitled "Expert Medical Testimony
and the Medical Expert," contained in the book entitled Physi-
cian In the Courtroom, in which he says: 4
6
"Webster's dictionary states '. . . Experts may be employed
in legal proceedings as witnesses on matters to which ordi-
nary observers could not without their aid form just con-
clusions.' The expert witness does not always fulfill these
objectives. Then, wherein does the fault lie? Most of it can
be attributed to a lack of understanding on the part of the
expert witness concerning the motivating principles of legal
procedures and a lack of understanding on the part of the
lawyer concerning the duties, capacities and limitations of
the field of knowledge of the expert witness. Although this
is generally true in respect to all expert witnesses in the
field of sciences, it is perhaps more pronounced in regard
to expert medical testimony. This is regrettable since justice
is dependent to some extent on medical evidence in about
one-half of the cases brought to appellate courts in the
United States. Certain cities have found that frank discus-
sions leading to mutual understanding of the objectives and
limitations of the court and of the problems, philosophies
and scope of knowledge of the expert witnesses have aided
effectively the administration of justice and fostered recip-
rocal respect between the medical and legal professions."
(Italics ours.)
This problem can be solved at the grass roots level by meet-
ings, symposia, or forumns of Medical Societies and Bar Associa-
tions, if speakers familiar with the subject are recruited to dis-
cuss the views of both professions.
I am also in complete accord with Dr. Gerber's views, with
reference to hypothetical questions, when he says very prop-
erly: 47
"Physicians who testify as expert medical witnesses need to
be indoctrinated in the rules governing hypothetical ques-
tions. If they do not understand these rules, they may err
in basing an opinion on facts not incorporated in the hypo-
thetical question." (Italics ours.)
46 Pages 67 et seq. (Press of West. Res. Univ.).
47 Ibid., page 74.
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In this connection, it is important to let our medical brethren
know that the rules governing accident cases hold the defendant
responsible for all damages sustained by an individual, regard-
less of the state of his prior health. Paraphrased in another way,
it has been stated that the wrongdoer takes the injured person
as he finds him; or as otherwise expressed, the wrongdoer is not
entitled to a perfectly healthy individual upon whom to inflict
injury.
Dr. Allen R. Moritz, in an article entitled "Trauma and
Heart Disease," taken from Physician in the Court Room, very
properly has said (page 83):
"Differences of opinion in respect to the part played by
trauma or stress in the causation of heart disease or in the
causation of the failure of the diseased heart are responsible
for an enormous volume of litigation. It is clear from re-
viewing the evidence presented before workman's com-
pensation boards and trial courts in such cases that many
attorneys know too little about the causal relationships that
may or may not exist and that many doctors are insuffi-
ciently critical in distinguishing between medical possibility
and medical probability." (Italics ours.) 4s
A recent Ohio case that is quite helpful with respect to the
form of a hypothetical question as to causal relationship, is
Brumage v. Industrial Commission of Ohio.49
Suggestions
1. Be sure to analyze the cases of your own jurisdiction on
the "reasonable certainty rule," in order to determine whether
or not your courts require reasonable medical certainty as to
causation.
2. Never, but never, attempt to prepare your attending physi-
cian or expert in an important personal injury case by a tele-
phone conversation. Visit your doctor at his office after his
office hours, and put it on a consultation fee basis. Discuss with
your doctor-witness the working diagnosis, final diagnosis, and
prognosis to which he will testify. Discuss the permanency
features with him, and the disability features. Prepare him for
the type of questions that you intend to propound in the court-
room. Explain the legal significance of the language you will
48 See Annotation on "could" or "might" at 135 A. L. R. 516-546, entitled
"Sufficiency of expert evidence to establish causal relation between accident
and physical condition or death," and cases there cited.
49 129 N. E. 2d 844 (Ohio, 1955). Also see discussion in 1 Negl. and Comp.
Serv. (NCS) (9) 71 (Oleck, Editor-in-Chief, 1956).
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adopt in the courtroom. Discuss the expected cross examination
features, and prepare him for them. If you are relying on the
history, be sure to tell the doctor that you will ask him whether
or not he obtained a history for the purpose of treatment.
3. Be sure to acquaint the doctor with the client's prior
working habits and details of employment, so that he can be
prepared to give his opinion as to whether or not the injury
had a disabling effect from doing that type of work for a "sus-
tained work-day."
4. Discuss the question of fee for his appearance in court,
so that if the doctor is asked on cross examination whether he
expects to be paid for his appearance in court, he will be able
to promptly answer, instead of being forced to equivocate by a
"smart" answer. Many doctors in their appearances before
juries are caught flatfooted on this subject, without a ready an-
swer, and their prestige before a jury suffers accordingly.
5. If you are involved in a case in which there is medical
controversy, discuss this feature fully with your medical wit-
ness. Doctor-made controversies exist today on causation or ag-
gravation of low back injury, disc injury, whiplash injury, brain
concussion, traumatic neurosis, and etcetera. It is important to
discuss his views on such controversial matters, with particular
relation to the instant case. You will find the doctor more at ease
in his own office when he discusses the medicolegal features of
the case, than if you call him to your office for consultation. You
will also find the doctor far more respectful of your preparation
of the reception of his testimony, if you make it a practice to
consult with him on a fee basis in advance of trial.
6. I you are intending to use a hypothetical question with
your doctor, as to causation, precipitation, aggravation or per-
manency of injury, or whether the same has any disabling effect,
I warn you that the hypothetical question should be adequately
discussed in advance with your doctor, so that he knows what
you are driving at, and is not surprised by hearing it for the
first time during the course of the trial.
7. Refer your doctor-witness to the literature on "causation,"
and the "reasonable certainty rule" referred to herein. I es-
pecially recommend your supplying him with a copy of Dr.
Theodore J. Curphey's remarks.50
50 See footnote 27.
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8. Encourage your local Bar Association to hold joint
Medico-Legal meetings or dinners, with the local Medical So-
ciety, at which speakers may discuss this serious problem.
9. Encourage Medico-Legal Forums and Symposia, where
doctors and lawyers can illustrate, by example, proper court
room techniques in accident cases, and especially the use of
hypothetical questions.
10. I recommend your reading Harry Gair's article on
Medical Legal Trial Techniques, appearing in the Law Science
Symposium issue of the Texas Law Review;51 and also his
monograph on the Trial of a Negligence Case published by the
Practising Law Institute.
I also commend to you the late Theodore T. Sindell's master-
ful article entitled "Preparation of the Medical Aspects of a
Personal Injury Case." 52
Also recommended is the June 1955 issue of Medical Trial
Technique Quarterly,5 3 discussing a traumatic epilepsy case that
the author tried. The record on appeal in this case is faithfully
followed in order to illustrate direct examination of several
medical specialists.5 4
Also recommended is Charles Kramer's monograph Medical
Aspects of Negligence Cases.55
11. I firmly believe that the doctor-lawyer relation would
be greatly improved if, in every county of the nation, there were
periodic joint dinner meetings of Bar Associations and Medical
Societies, attended by trial lawyers and by doctors having court-
room experience. Such medico-legal symposia, or meetings, have
won the unqualified approval of the American Medical Associa-
tion, as evidenced by an Editorial in their September 24, 1955
Journal.56 This article praises such meetings, and specifically
mentions the Cortland County, New York meeting at which the
author had the pleasure of speaking. It discusses this meeting
in great detail, and makes the following comment in its con-
cluding paragraph:
51 June, 1953 ed.
52 Law & Medicine Symposium, 3 J. Pub. L. (No. 2).
53 Pages 63 et seq.
54 Dakin v. State, 130 N. Y. S. 2d 288, affd. 284 A. D. 53, 130 N. Y. S. 2d 39
(1953).
55 Published by Practising Law Institute.
56 Page 383.
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"The experience of the physicians and attorneys in Cortland
County, New York, is being duplicated in many parts of the
country. The snowball is growing larger. Physicians and
attorneys will understand each other, they will improve
their professional interrelationships, and society and the
administration of justice will benefit from their efforts in
this regard."
12. "The District of Columbia and twenty five state medical
societies have either established liaison with their bar associa-
tions or expect to do so in the near future," according to an edito-
rial entitled "Medicine and the Law," in the Journal of the
American Medical Association (April 14, 1956). It is urged that
such liaison committees should be formed in all of the states, in
order to work out programs to eliminate misunderstandings
between the professions of law and medicine, and to solve prob-
lems such as those outlined herein.
Conclusion
Dr. Daniel Collier Elkin, Professor of Surgery at Emory
University School of Medicine, recently said: 5
"... Medicolegal clinics and seminars have become a vital
part of the post-graduate education of the lawyer as well as
of the physician. . . . A more intelligent use of medical
libraries and research materials by the lawyer and a better
understanding by the physician as to the part he is to play
in the courtroom result from our joint enterprises of work-
ing and studying together.
"Much in the way of opportunity lies ahead for us of the
medical and legal professions. Through the continuation of
the spirit of good will and cooperation . . . much can be
accomplished leading toward a better life.
"As we strive to develop those technical skills and knowl-
edges peculiar to our respective professions, may we also
strive to work together for the attainment of the broader
goal of making this a better world-physically, socially,
morally, and spiritually. And then, as succinctly stated by
Oliver Wendell Holmes, the renowned jurist and son of a
physician, we 'may catch an echo of the infinite.' "
A quotation from the Interprofessional Code of North Caro-
lina, enacted by the Bar Association and Medical Societies of
North Carolina, offers an apt closing comment. The code prop-
erly says: 58
57 3 J. Pub. L. 289 (A Symposium on Law and Medicine).
58 See also a doctor's view of the problem, in, Shindell, Sidney, Medicine
Versus Law: A Proposal of Settlement, 151 J. A. M. A. (13) 1078-1080
(Mar. 28, 1953).
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"It is recognized that both legal and medical professions are
essential to society; and their aims are essentially parallel.
This necessitates at all times full understanding and co-
operation. Each has the duty to develop an enlightened and
tolerant understanding of the other in the best interests of
the public, as well as the reputations of the two professions."
[Editorial Comment on the foregoing article.
Medicine is not an exact science. It is a biological science, and may not
be compared to such studies as physics and chemistry. There, all variables
may be controlled, and a particular reaction may be accurately predicted.
To be learned in the biological sciences, one must be schooled to think in
the basic or exact sciences. However, it is fundamental in the study of
medicine that all humans do not react in the same manner to a given
stimulus. Medical judgment is the product of a physician's experiences in
clinical practice, built upon the basic structure of sound medical education.
But when opinions of a physician are requested in court on subjects which
are beyond the scope of medical knowledge, they fall into the realm of a
guess. Logistics and semantics may be argued forever. Mr. Averbach has
stated that ". . . most doctors concede that anything is possible in medicine."
If this is true, then further testimony on the subject is unnecessary.
To correct an almost irreconcilable difference as to basic thinking, a
possible solution might be an independent, disinterested Board of medical
experts, such as has been advocated by several judges. Such a group could
examine the patient, or the facts, and give the court an opinion. Since the
proof does not have to be conclusive, this group could decide by a pre-
ponderance of the opinion.
CARL E. WASMUTH, M. D.
of the Board of the
Cleveland-Marshall Law Review.]
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